Lógica

Bealer's Intensional Logic (Part II)

Speaker: Clarence Protin.

Abstract: Many intuitively valid arguments involving intensionality cannot be captured by first-order logic, even when extended by modal and epistemic operators.

Indeed, previous attempts at providing an adequate treatment of the phenomenon of intensionality in logic and language, such as those of Frege, Church, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Montague and others are fraught with numerous philosophical and technical difficulties and shortcomings.

Bealer's Intensional Logic (Part I)

Speaker: Clarence Protin.

Abstract: Many intuitively valid arguments involving intensionality cannot be captured by first-order logic, even when extended by modal and epistemic operators.

Indeed, previous attempts at providing an adequate treatment of the phenomenon of intensionality in logic and language, such as those of Frege, Church, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Montague and others are fraught with numerous philosophical and technical difficulties and shortcomings.

Bealer's Intensional Logic - Part I (Evento Cancelado)

Cancelamento motivado pela aplicação do plano de contingência da Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa, na sequência das orientações da Direção-Geral de Saúde e das recomendações por parte da Reitoria da Universidade de Lisboa, relativamente ao novo Coronavírus (COVID-19).

Mais informações: https://ciencias.ulisboa.pt/pt/saude.


Speaker: Clarence Protin.

Fregean variables

Por Bruno Jacinto (Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa).

Abstract: According to Frege, variables are punctuation marks. They have no meaning. In particular, variables neither refer arbitrarily nor have as their semantic values objects with the property of being arbitrary.

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